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1 Introduction 
1.1 Importance of data protection internationally 
Laws that regulate the processing1 of personal information/data,2 referred to as 
data protection laws,3 have been adopted worldwide since the mid-1970s.4 For 
the European Union5 (EU), data protection is such an important issue that it is 
listed as a fundamental right in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.6
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1  Processing refers to any operation which is performed on data. This includes actions such 
as collection, recording, organisation, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, use, 
consultation, disclosure, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure, destruction and 
transmittal. 
2  The phrase 'personal information' is used in the sense of information that can be 
connected to a person. It is usually defined as information relating to and permitting 
identification of individuals or persons (Bygrave Data Protection Law 2). It has been 
pointed out on another occasion (Roos 2007 SALJ 401, n 4) that the two concepts, data 
and information, are not synonymous (data are unstructured facts or raw material that 
needs to be processed and organised to produce information) but that in most legal 
contexts it is unnecessarily pedantic to maintain a distinction between the two concepts 
(also see Bygrave Data Protection Law 20). 
3  Sometimes also referred to as privacy laws – see, eg, the USA Privacy Act of 1974. 
4  The first data protection law was adopted in 1970 in the German state of Hesse. Sweden 
enacted the first national data protection law in 1973, followed by the USA in 1974. Since 
then numerous other countries have adopted data protection laws and many have already 
revised their first data protection laws or have adopted completely new, second-generation 
laws: the Netherlands adopted its second-generation data protection law in 2000 (Wet 
Bescherming Persoonsgegevens 2000) and the UK adopted its in 1998 (Data Protection 
Act of 1998). On 'generations' in data protection laws, see Bygrave, supra n 2, 87-88. 
5  The EU flowed from the European Community (EC). The aim of the EC is the attainment of 
a 'single market' in Europe by removing physical, technical and fiscal barriers. The Treaty 
on European Union (signed in Maastricht in 1992) added political cooperation to the 
existing Community structure. Since 1993 the EC has also been referred to as the EU, a 
term that refers to the aim of political union. The EU at present consists of 27 European 
countries. See also EU 2008 http://europa.eu/abc/index_en.htm 24 Nov. 
6 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] Official Journal C 364/1 
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Furthermore, the 1995 Directive on data protection7 compels all EU member 
countries to adopt data protection legislation and to prevent the transfer of 
personal data to non-EU member countries ('third countries') that do not 
provide an adequate level of data protection. Adequacy is assessed in the light 
of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation and 
consideration must be given to the nature of the data, the country of origin, the 
country of final destination, and the laws in that country.8 Transfers of personal 
data must be authorised by a member state, notwithstanding the absence of 
adequate protection in the recipient state, in a number of specific instances 
where there is a legal basis for the transfer, such as the unambiguous consent 
of the data subject.9 In addition, transfers may also be authorised where the 
controller adduces 'adequate safeguards' with respect to the protection of 
privacy, in particular by concluding an appropriate contract with the party 
receiving the personal information.10
                                                                                                                               
provides the following in art 8: Protection of personal data 
 These provisions result in the Directive 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. 
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or 
her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority. 
7  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of Such Data 1995 Official Journal L 281/31 (hereinafter referred to as 
“the data protection Directive” and quoted as Dir 95/46/EC). Reference will be made to the 
1995 Directive as the “EU Directive on data protection”, since it operates among member 
states of the EU. However, the Directive is actually a European Community (EC) Directive, 
since it was proposed as a means towards an economic end (Korff Data Protection Laws 
in the EU 8). 
8  Art 25 Dir 95/46/EC.  
9  Art 26(1) Dir 95/46/EC. Other acceptable grounds for international transfers listed in art 
26(1) are as follows: the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between 
the data subject and the controller or the implementation of pre-contractual measures 
taken in response to the data subject’s request; the transfer is necessary for the 
conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in the interest of the data subject 
between the controller and a third party; the transfer is necessary or legally required on 
important public interest grounds, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal 
claims; the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or 
the transfer is made from a register which according to laws or regulations is intended to 
provide information to the public and which is open to consultation, either by the public in 
general, or by any person who can demonstrate legitimate interest, to the extent that the 
conditions laid down in law for consultation are fulfilled in the particular case. 
10  Art 26(2) Dir 95/46/EC. 
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having extra-territorial effect and exerting an influence in countries outside the 
EU. 
 
Although the USA as a general rule is reluctant to regulate the information 
industry, it nevertheless concluded an agreement (the 'Safe Harbor' 
agreement)11 with the EU to ensure that the free flow of personal information 
between Europe and the USA was not restricted on the EU side due to 
inadequate personal data protection in the USA.12 Many other countries outside 
the EU fold also adopted data protection laws, because of the influence of the 
Organisation for Co-operation and Development (OECD) guidelines on data 
protection,13
                                            
11  The 'Safe Harbor' agreement was concluded in 1998 between the US Department of 
Commerce and the Internal Market Directorate of the European Commission. 
Organisations in the USA may decide to participate by complying with the 'Safe Harbor' 
requirements and by declaring publicly that they do so. Their names are added to a list 
maintained by the US Department of Commerce. Organisations in the EU who want to 
export personal data to them can consult this list to determine whether particular 
companies in the USA are participating. See Department of Commerce Safe Harbor 
Agreement 
 or the influence of the Council of Europe negotiations with the EU 
to declare that their data protection regimes provide 'adequate' data protection. 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor 24 Nov. 
12  At federal level, the USA does not have a general data protection law. Instead, different 
pieces of legislation are involved. Examples are the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, the 
Privacy Act of 1974, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, the Privacy Protection Act 
of 1980, the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998. This means that different types of 
personal information are given different levels of protection. The USA is a member of the 
OECD and several hundred US companies have adopted the OECD Guidelines on data 
protection (see n 13 more detail). In the private sector one finds therefore that fair 
information practices have been created through industry self-regulation. However, the 
application of these principles is voluntary and they are not legally binding on the 
companies. As such they may be changed at any time by the companies involved. The 
lack of an independent data protection authority is also seen by privacy commentators as 
a serious flaw in US law (Flaherty Surveillance Societies 367). 
13  OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data Paris, 23 September 1981 (hereafter OECD Guidelines). The OECD is an 
international organisation with headquarters in Paris. It is composed of 30 of the leading 
industrial states (including inter alia all EU member states, Australia, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey and the USA) sharing the principles of democracy, 
market economy and respect for human rights (see OECD 2008 http://www.oecd.org 24 
Nov). The OECD also involves non-member countries in its work. The OECD’s affiliation 
with 70 non-member countries, of which South Africa is one, gives it global reach. See 
also Kuner European Data Privacy Law 36 and par 2.5.1 below. 
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A finding by the EU14 that a third country provides adequate data protection 
results in such a country’s being put on a 'white list', and EU member countries 
may then not impede the transfer of personal data to that country.15
 
 
Despite the apparent importance of data protection, South Africa is lagging 
behind in this area. For the last three decades South African academics have 
been pointing out that it is important for South Africa to adopt a data protection 
Act.16 Proposals for the adoption of an Act for the protection of personal 
information have been on the table for more than three years,17
 
 but it seems as 
if the political will to enact such an act is absent.  
1.2 Aim of the article 
One may ask whether or not other countries, apart from Europe and, to a 
certain extent the USA, take data protection seriously. In this regard it is 
instructive to consider the position in New Zealand. The focus of this article is 
on the data protection provisions in New Zealand law, with a view to 
establishing if South Africa can learn any lessons from them.  
 
Before discussing the specific data protection Act (the Privacy Act of 1993), the 
legal background against which this Act operates will be briefly explored. Data 
protection is an aspect of the right to privacy.18
                                            
14  The Commission of the EU (executive branch of the EU) is authorised to negotiate with 
third countries that fall short on the adequacy provision (art 25(5) Dir 95/46/EC). 
 It therefore has to be 
established whether New Zealand law recognises and protects a right to 
privacy in common law, constitutional law or statutory law. Traditionally, privacy 
is defined “as the right to be let alone". This definition was made famous in 
15  Art 25(6) Dir 95/46/EC. 
16  Neethling argued in favour of data protection legislation in his thesis in 1976 – see 
Privaatheid 406. See also Neethling 1980 THRHR 155; id ”Databeskerming” 105 et seq; 
McQuoid-Mason Privacy 195 et seq; Eiselen Reg op privaatheid in die inligtingsera par 7; 
Roos 1990 TSAR 265; Schulze 1994 THRHR 85-86; Burns Communications Law 201. 
17  See SALRC Privacy and Data Protection Discussion Paper 109 http://www.doj.gov.za/ 
salrc/ 24 Nov. 
18  See Bennett Regulating Privacy 23; Flaherty, supra n 12, xiii; Bygrave, supra n 2, 125 et 
seq.  
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1890 by two American lawyers, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.19 With the 
emergence of information technology the need arose for this definition to be 
adapted and another American, Alan F Westin, reformulated the definition of 
privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others".20 This claim to self-determination is the essence of a 
person’s interest in privacy. Today these two basic ideas of privacy, the right to 
be let alone and the right to control personal information, form the core of data 
protection, according to Blume.21
 
 It stands to reason that without control over 
one’s personal information, one’s privacy will be greatly diminished and may 
ultimately be lost. 
After the discussion of the legal protection of privacy in New Zealand, the New 
Zealand data protection Act itself will be considered. Finally, an attempt will be 
made to draw conclusions from which South Africa can learn some lessons. 
 
 
2 Data protection in New Zealand 
2.1 Introduction 
Like South Africa, New Zealand is a 'third' country in terms of the EU Directive 
on data protection. What this means is that member countries of the EU may 
export personal data to New Zealand only if New Zealand provides adequate 
data protection. 
 
Historically New Zealand has strong political ties with the UK. It also has strong 
trading ties with Europe. New Zealand is a nation of traders and as such 
depends on the free flow of information to and from it. International trade is 
always accompanied by the exchange of information and more often than not 
                                            
19  Warren and Brandeis 1890 Harv L Rev 193. 
20  Westin Privacy and Freedom 7. 
21  Blume 1997 Int R L Computers & Tech 195. Also see Bygrave 2001 UNSWLJ 279-281. 
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this information can be classified as personal information.22 New Zealand 
recognised the need for data protection and adopted a data protection Act over 
15 years ago. In the words of the New Zealand Law Commission,23
 
 “the issue 
in the area of data protection is not whether it is necessary but rather how it 
should be carried out as efficiently and effectively as possible”. 
2.2 The right to privacy in common law 
New Zealand received the whole body of English law as it existed in 1840. It 
therefore also received the English common law.24 The English common law 
does not recognise a general right to privacy.25 In New Zealand, nevertheless, 
privacy was always recognised as a 'silent value' in the law, present in certain 
situations but unexpressed.26 It has been recognised over a long period as a 
value worth protecting, even if that protection has not expressly been 
articulated.27
                                            
22  Consider a transaction such as the selling of an international flight ticket. This kind of 
transaction involves the transfer of the name and passport number of the individual. The 
importance of the free flow of information for commerce is expressed by Lloyd Information 
Technology Law 236 in the following terms: "Whilst there may be concerns at the 
implications of transfers, however, transborder data flows are essential for commercial 
activities. Many thousands of messages must be transmitted prior to an aircraft flying from 
London to New York. This will include passenger details. In this context, transborder data 
flows constitute no mere esoteric topic. If the data cannot flow, planes cannot fly." 
 The courts have acknowledged that privacy values underlie and 
inform other rules of law and infringements of privacy have therefore 
sometimes been redressed under other heads of common law. For example, 
the privacy of the home has been protected by torts such as trespass and 
nuisance; the privacy of the body by criminal offences and torts such as 
assault, battery, intentional infliction of nervous shock and negligence; the 
privacy of personal information by breach of contract and torts such as breach 
of confidence, negligence, copyright, defamation, malicious falsehood and the 
23  New Zealand Law Commission Study Paper 19 par 3.53 (hereafter NZLC SP 19). 
24  See Greville 2002 LLRX http://www.llrx.com/ 16 Jun. 
25 Rogers Torts 464. 
26  NZLC SP 19 par 4.1. 
27  Burrows “Invasion of Privacy” 745. 
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tort of passing off, depending on the circumstances.28 Tobin,29
 
 however, points 
out that these actions do not provide a remedy for every invasion of privacy.  
According to Palmer,30 privacy as a legal issue arrived in New Zealand “by 
osmosis” from overseas. A privacy tort has been developed in the USA since 
the end of the 19th century.31 By the 1960s, four separate privacy torts had 
been identified by Prosser,32 namely (a) intrusion into the plaintiff’s solitude, 
seclusion or private affairs, (b) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts 
about the plaintiff, (c) publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light and (d) 
appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or image.33
 
  
Growing attention to privacy in New Zealand during the 1970s, evident from the 
judgments of the courts34 and Acts of Parliament,35 eventually raised the 
question as to whether or not New Zealand courts36
                                            
28  NZLC SP 19 par 4.11; Tobin 2000 NZLJ 216. 
 should follow the lead of 
29  Tobin 2000 NZLJ 216. 
30  Palmer 1975 NZLJ 747. 
31  Before 1890 no English or US court recognised a right to privacy. Warren and Brandeis, 
supra n 19, wrote their now very famous law review article in that year. In the article they 
contended that common law implicitly recognised the right to privacy in that the courts had 
in the past granted relief for the invasion of privacy on a combination of different common 
law doctrines. Their article “initiated and theoretically outlined a new field of jurisprudence” 
(see Larremore 1912 Columbia L Rev 708). 
32 Prosser 1960 Cal L Rev 383-389.  
33  Prosser’s framework of four torts became widely accepted in the USA and in 1977 the ALI 
Restatement (Second) of Torts accepted this division. But see Bloustein 1964 NYULR 
962, who criticised the division of the tort of privacy invasion into four separate torts, 
because it undermined Warren and Brandeis’s axiom of 'inviolate personality' and 
undermined the moral basis of privacy as an aspect of human dignity. 
34  From the mid-1970s the NZ courts began to take into consideration the fact that privacy 
was invaded when assessing damages in other causes of action (Ramsay v Cooke [1984] 
2 NZLR 680 687 (HC); NZLC SP 9 par 4.61). Privacy as a value was also recognised by 
NZ courts when applying legislation involving search or interception warrants and police 
powers (Auckland Medical Aid Trust v Taylor [1975] 1 NZLR 728 737 (CA); Transport 
Ministry v Payn [1977] NZLR 50 64 (CA); Moulton v Police [1980] 1 NZLR 443 (CA); see 
also Savelio v R [2005] NZCA 198. 
35  Eg, the Broadcasting Act of 1976, the Human Rights Act of 1977 and the Crimes Act of 
1961. See further par 2.3 below. 
36  The question was also asked in other common law countries. English courts refused to 
follow the American courts and several judges made strong statements to the effect that 
English law recognises no right to privacy (see R v Brown [1996] AC 543 557 (HL); R (on 
the application of Wainwright) v Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council [2001] 
EWCA Civ 2062, CA; Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 70; Malone v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner (No 2) [1979] 2 All ER 620). English courts have, nevertheless, extended 
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US courts. By 1986 it had been held by a New Zealand high court that New 
Zealand law recognised a tort of publication of private facts37 (the second of 
Prosser’s four torts). That view gathered momentum38 and was confirmed in 
2004 by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Hosking v Runting,39 with a 
majority of three to two.40
 
  
In this case, a magazine commissioned a photographer to take pictures of the 
twin babies of a well-known television presenter. The pictures were taken while 
the mother was on a shopping trip with the babies. Although the court 
recognised the existence of a tort of publication of private facts, the application 
for an injunction was denied because the photographs were taken in a public 
place. 
 
Gault P summarised the broad content of the tort of invasion of privacy by 
publication of private facts in the following terms: 41
 
 
It is actionable as a tort to publish information or material in respect 
of which the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy, unless 
that information or material constitutes a matter of legitimate public 
concern justifying publication in the public interest. Whether the 
plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy depends largely on 
whether publication of the information or material about the plaintiff's 
private life would in the particular circumstances cause substantial 
offence to a reasonable person. Whether there is sufficient public 
concern about the information or material to justify the publication 
will depend on whether in the circumstances those to whom the 
                                                                                                                               
the boundaries of the remedy of breach of confidence (influenced also by the Human 
Rights Act of 1998) to such an extent that by 2004 the House of Lords had awarded 
damages to celebrity model Naomi Campbell when a newspaper published details of drug 
therapy she was undergoing, together with a photo of her outside a rehabilitation centre 
(Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 AC 457 (HL)). See also Douglas v Hello! [2001] QB 967; [2001] 
2 All ER 289. 
37  See Tucker v News Media Ownership [1986] 2 NZLR 716 (HC) discussed by Tobin, supra 
n 29, 217. 
38  See Bradley v Wingnut Films [1993] 1 NZLR 415; P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591; L v G [2002] 
DCR 234, [2002] NZAR 495. Also see Tobin 2004 TLJ 95 96-99 for a short overview of the 
early development of privacy interests in New Zealand. 
39  Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA).  
40  See NZLC SP 19 par 4.73. See also Rogers v Television New Zealand [2007] NZSC 91; 
Andrews v TVNZ [15 December 2006] HC AK CIV 2004-4-4-353.  
41  Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 32 (CA).  
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publication is made can reasonably be said to have a right to be 
informed about it. 
 
In essence, two elements have to be proved: the existence of facts in respect 
of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy; and publicity given to 
those private facts that would be considered highly offensive42 to an objective, 
reasonable person. 43
 
 
Publication could be justified by the fact that the information involves a 
legitimate public concern.44 The court emphasised that “the scope of privacy 
protection should not exceed such limits on the freedom of expression as is 
justified in a free and democratic society”.45 The court was of the opinion that 
the defence of legitimate public concern will ensure this. The court held that the 
“significant value to be accorded freedom of expression requires that the tort of 
privacy [infringement] must necessarily be tightly confined".46 The competing 
values of the privacy of the individual and the public’s right to receive 
information have to be balanced. Before publication will be allowed, the level of 
public concern must outweigh the level of harm likely to be caused by the 
publication.47 The primary remedy upon a successful claim is an award of 
damages, but injunctive relief may be appropriate in some circumstances.48
 
 
As far as the tort of intentional intrusion is concerned (the third of Prosser’s 
torts), this has received less consideration by the New Zealand courts and 
Tobin argues that it “is perhaps still arguable whether it exists in New 
Zealand".49
                                            
42  One of the majority judges, Tipping J, would settle for 'substantially' offensive publication – 
ibid 61-62. 
 The court in Hosking expressly did not answer the question 
43  Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 32 (CA). 
44  Ibid 32. 
45  Ibid 35. 
46  Ibid 35-36. 
47  Ibid 36. The fact that minor children are involved, as in Hosking, should be taken into 
account. The court emphasised that “the vulnerability of children must be accorded real 
weight and their private lives will seldom be of concern to the public” (at 38). 
48  Ibid 38.  
49  Tobin, supra n 29, 217. See TV3 Network Services v Farhey [1999] 2 NZLR 129 which 
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whether intrusion into seclusion or solitude will be included under the tort of 
invasion of privacy:50
 
 
… we emphasise that at this point we are concerned only with the 
third formulation of the privacy tort identified by Prosser and 
developed in the United States cases: wrongful publicity given to 
private lives. We need not decide at this time whether a tortious 
remedy should be available in New Zealand law for unreasonable 
intrusion into a person's solitude or seclusion … 
 
The fourth of Prosser’s torts, namely “appropriation of plaintiff’s name or 
image", was expressly rejected in the Hosking case; the court held that there 
was no cause of action in New Zealand law directed to the misappropriation of 
one's image.51
In conclusion, although privacy has been recognised in New Zealand common 
law as a 'silent value' from early on, a tort of public disclosure of private facts 
has only recently been developed by the judiciary in New Zealand. This tort is 
limited to publications that are 'highly offensive' to an objective reasonable 
person. The protection of privacy in tort law is not significant from a data 
protection perspective, since data protection does not only involve the 
disclosure of personal information in a manner that is 'highly offensive'. Data 
protection also involves the non-offensive collection, storage, use and 
transmission of personal information.  
  
 
2.3 Constitutional protection of privacy 
New Zealand does not have a codified constitution. It does, however, have 
several constitutional documents, one of which is the Bill of Rights Act of 
1990.52
                                                                                                                               
comes within the ambit of this tort. 
 It was adopted to implement in New Zealand law the United Nations 
50  See Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 32 (CA). 
51  Ibid 42. 
52  The Act is often referred to in literature as NZBORA (New Zealand Bill of Rights Act). 
Other constitutional documents include the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840, the Statute of 
Westminster Adoption Act of 1947, the Constitution Act of 1986, and the Supreme Court 
Act of 2003. This latter created the Supreme Court of New Zealand, which is now the court 
of last resort. Until 2004, appeals were possible to the Privy Council in London.  
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.53 The Bill of Rights Act 
does not have an express provision protecting privacy,54 despite the fact that 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects privacy in 
article 17.55 Nevertheless, as pointed out by the Law Commission,56
 
 
notwithstanding the unaffirmed status of privacy, considerations of 
privacy potentially arise in certain New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
enquiries: 
 
• under section 5 (as a justifiable limitation on affirmed rights 
and freedoms); and 
• under section 21 (protection from unreasonable search and 
seizure by State enforcement agencies). 
 
Privacy is implicitly protected by section 21 of the Bill of Rights Act, which 
provides that 
 
[e]veryone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search 
or seizure, whether of the person, property, or correspondence or 
otherwise. 
 
The courts have held that this section protects a reasonable expectation of 
privacy during search and seizure.57
 
  
Privacy can also be considered under section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act, which 
provides that  
                                            
53  UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (GA Res 2200A (XXI) of 16 
December 1966). It entered into force on 23 March 1976. 
54  The reason why privacy was not enacted in the Bill of Rights Act was that at the time the 
right to privacy was considered to be too vague and uncertain. In the White Paper 
commentary on the search and seizure clause, it was said that “it would be inappropriate 
to attempt to entrench a right that is not by any means fully recognised now, which is in the 
course of development, and whose boundaries would be uncertain and contentious” (see 
NZ Department of Justice White Paper at 104, as quoted in NZLC SP 19 at 97). 
55  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra n 53, art 17 provides as follows: 
(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his [or her] privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his [or her] honour and 
reputation.  
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
56  NZLC SP 19 at 92. 
57  R v Grayson and Taylor [1997] 1 NZLR 399 (CA); R v Fraser [1997] 2 NZLR 442 (CA). 
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the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be 
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
 
It has been held, for example in Hosking v Runting,58 that privacy can be a 
justifiable limitation imposed on freedom of expression,59 a right which is 
expressly protected by the Bill of Rights Act.60
 
  
The fact that privacy is recognised as a justifiable limitation on affirmed 
constitutional rights, such as the right to freedom of expression, is significant 
from a data protection perspective. Where a data protection provision overlaps 
with a constitutionally recognised right or freedom, such as freedom of 
expression, it does not necessarily mean that the data protection provision has 
to give way to the constitutional right or freedom. Rather, a balancing of the two 
competing values has to take place. 
 
2.4 Statutory protection of privacy 
Several statutes protecting privacy in specific, targeted areas have been 
adopted in New Zealand since the mid-1970s.61 In chronological order, 
reference can be made to the Private Investigators and Security Guards Act of 
1974,62
                                            
58  [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA). 
 which makes it an offence for a private detective to photograph, film or 
videotape a person or record a person’s voice without that person’s consent. 
The first Broadcasting Act was introduced in 1976. This Act provided that the 
Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand was responsible for maintaining 
standards in broadcasting acceptable to the community. One of the values it 
59  Not all judges are in agreement on this. The dissenting judges in Hosking argued that 
privacy was in the nature of a value only which should not trump the right of freedom of 
expression. Hosking v Runting [2005] NZLR 1 63 (CA). See also Brooker v Police [2007] 
NZSC 30. 
60  S14 of the NZ Bill of Rights Act of 1990 provides as follows: "Everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and 
opinions of any kind in any form."  
61  See NZLC SP 19 par 4.33, 4.37, 4.55. 
62  S 52. 
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was to consider was the privacy of the individual.63 The Human Rights Act of 
197764 gives the Human Rights Commission monitoring functions in relation to 
privacy: it can report to the Prime Minister matters of concern about privacy, 
invite representations from members of the public, and so on. The Crimes Act 
of 1961 was amended in 1979 to add a new Part 9A in which “crimes against 
personal privacy” are described. The Family Proceedings Act of 1980 protects 
the privacy of individuals in divorce proceedings by providing that dissolution of 
marriage cases are to be heard in closed court and that publication of the 
proceedings is permitted only by an order of the court.65
 
 The Official 
Information Act of 1982 protects the privacy of the individual while making 
information held by government organisations available to the public.  
A statute of particular significance for privacy protection is the Broadcasting Act 
of 1989. This Act replaces the earlier Broadcasting Act of 1976. It provides that 
all broadcasters must maintain standards in their programming which are 
acceptable to the community.66 Among other things, they must maintain 
standards which are consistent with the privacy of the individual.67 
Broadcasters cannot be held liable in terms of civil law for breaches of the 
Act,68 but complaints are heard by the Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA), 
an independent body set up in terms of the Act.69
 
  
                                            
63  Ss 24 and 96 Broadcasting Act of 1976. 
64  S 67. 
65  S 159. See also the Care of Children Act of 2004 that protects the privacy of children in 
court proceedings. 
66  S 4(1) Broadcasting Act of 1989. 
67  Ibid s 4(1)(c). Standards must also be consistent with good taste and decency; with the 
maintenance of law and order; with the principle that when controversial issues of public 
importance are discussed, reasonable efforts are made, or reasonable opportunities are 
given, to present significant points of view, either in the same programme or in other 
programmes within the period of current interest; with any approved code of broadcasting 
practice applying to the programmes (s 4(1)(a), (b), (d) and (e)).  
68  Ibid s 4(3). 
69  Ibid s 20. If the BSA finds that its standards have been breached, it can award 
compensation up to $5 000 (s 13).  
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The BSA has formulated a set of principles to be applied to privacy complaints. 
Eight principles have been formulated to date.70 The principles state that the 
disclosure of private facts, or public facts that have become private again (for 
example because of lapse of time), is inconsistent with an individual’s privacy if 
such disclosure is highly offensive to an objective, reasonable person. The 
public disclosure of private facts that have been obtained by means of an 
intrusion into an individual’s solitude and seclusion is also inconsistent with the 
privacy of the individual if the intrusion was highly offensive to an objective 
reasonable person. There is a 'public place' exemption to the last-mentioned 
principle, allowing the recording, photography or filming of a person in a public 
place. However, this exemption does not apply if the individual is particularly 
vulnerable and the publication would be highly offensive to an objective, 
reasonable person. It is a defence against a privacy complaint that the 
individual has consented to the publication. However, where the privacy of a 
child under the age of 16 is involved it is not sufficient for broadcasters to 
obtain informed consent. They must also satisfy themselves that the child’s 
best interest is served by the publication. It is also a defence against a privacy 
complaint that the disclosure was made in the public interest. Public interest is 
defined as “of legitimate concern or interest to the public".71
 
 
These principles go further than the common law tort of publication of private 
facts, since they also consider conduct that is an intrusion into privacy as 
inconsistent with the privacy of the individual.72
 
 
The BSA hears about 20 complaints a year and, according to the New Zealand 
Law Commission, has built up a substantial jurisprudence in the application of 
these principles. It is therefore to be expected that the courts will turn to these 
decisions, even if they are not binding precedents.73
                                            
70  These principles can be found at BSA 
 This Act is therefore 
http://www.bsa.govt.nz 24 Nov. 
71  Ibid. 
72  Refer back to par 2.1 above. 
73  NZLC SP 19 par 8.62. 
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significant for privacy law in general, since it plays a role in the development of 
privacy jurisprudence. 
 
2.5 The Privacy Act of 1993 
2.5.1 Introduction 
In the mid-1960s various parts of the New Zealand government recognised the 
benefits of having a large computer system which could be used by different 
agencies. Plans to develop the Wanganui Computer Centre and allow agencies 
to have routine access to information held by other agencies caused public 
concern. The common law did not provide for the protection of the privacy of 
personal information and it was therefore necessary for the government to step 
in and pass the Wanganui Computer Centre Act of 1976. This Act set out the 
types of information that any one agency was allowed access to. Other 
agencies had to be authorised under the Act to have access to that specified 
information. In 1991 the office of the Privacy Commissioner was established by 
the Privacy Commissioner Act of 1991. The Privacy Commissioner’s key 
function was to oversee data matching between the different government 
agencies.  
 
This last-mentioned Act was followed by the Privacy Act of 1993. The Privacy 
Act repealed the Wanganui Computer Act as well as the Privacy 
Commissioner’s Act.  
 
The Privacy Act of 1993 does not, as its name perhaps suggests, create a 
general right to privacy. The Privacy Act is a data protection Act. The aim of the 
Act is to promote and protect individual privacy in accordance with the data 
protection guidelines of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD),74 of which New Zealand is a member. The OECD 
Guidelines,75
                                            
74  Also see par 1.1 above. 
 the first international statement on data protection, were adopted 
75  OECD Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection 
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in 1980. They advocate the adoption of good data protection practices to 
prevent unnecessary restrictions on trans-border data flows.76
 
 
In discussing the Act we will first establish its scope of application. Then three 
aspects which are central to the Act’s application77
 
 will be looked at: the 
information privacy principles, the role of the Privacy Commissioner, and the 
codes of practice. 
2.5.2 Scope of the Act 
The Act regulates the collection, use and disclosure of personal information. 
The Act draws no distinction between automatic and non-automatic processing 
activities.78
 
 The Act therefore equally applies to both types of processing.  
The scope of the Act is to a large extent determined by the various definitions 
that can be found in section 2(1) of the Act. Personal information is defined as 
“information about an identifiable individual” and it includes “information that 
relates to a death” that is “maintained pursuant to the Births, Deaths, and 
Marriages Registration Act of 1995". An individual is defined as “a natural 
person, other than a deceased natural person". The effect of these two 
definitions is that the Act protects the information only of natural persons and 
that juristic persons are not protected. Further, a deceased person’s personal 
information is not protected, but the fact that a person is deceased is seemingly 
protected! 
 
Public and private sector agencies are alike subject to the privacy protection 
principles. This is evident from the definition of an agency as “any person or 
body of persons … whether in the public sector or in the private sector". A 
                                                                                                                               
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data Paris, 23 September 1980. 
76  For a discussion of the OECD’s data protection guidelines, see Roos Data (Privacy) 
Protection 155-173. 
77  See Mount 1992-1995 Auckland University L Rev 410. 
78  In this article the collective term 'processing activities' is sometimes used to refer to 
'collection, use and disclosure'. 
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number of institutions or bodies are excluded from the definition of agency, 
such as the Sovereign, the Parliament, a court in its judicial functions, a 
commission of inquiry and so on. An important exemption from the definition of 
'agency' is the one made for the news media in relation to its news activities. 
This means that the information privacy principles do not apply to the news 
media when it is gathering or reporting news. The Act defines a news medium 
as any agency whose business, or part of whose business, consists of a news 
activity. This exemption, according to Tobin,79
 
 confirms the paramount 
importance that the dissemination of news and current affairs has in a 
democracy.  
Apart from the definitional section of the Act, one also has to look at specific 
exemptions made by the Act in order to determine its scope. Three exemptions 
are made from the privacy principles. First, if the Commissioner has authorised, 
in terms of section 54 of the Act, the collection, use or disclosure of the 
information, the processing activities are exempt from some of the information 
privacy principles.80 Secondly, if the information is of a certain type listed in the 
Act,81 it is exempted from the access and rectification principles.82 Thirdly, if it 
is information kept by individuals for purely personal, home or family purposes, 
it is exempted from all of the principles.83
 
  
                                            
79  Tobin “Privacy and Freedom of Expression” 136.  
80  According to the NZ Privacy Commissioner, "section 54 of the Privacy Act allows the 
Commissioner to authorise actions that would otherwise be a breach of principles 2, 10 or 
11. The power to grant specific exemptions gives the Act extra flexibility by taking account 
of unanticipated collection, use or disclosure of information that is in the public interest or 
in the interests of the person concerned. Section 54 can be useful when some disclosure 
ought to be made in the public interest but there is a duty under the Act not to disclose and 
the agency has not formulated a clear policy enabling disclosure. It can also act as a 
'safety valve' to address rare and unexpected problems." See NZ Privacy Commissioner 
Annual Report 2007 http://www.privacy.org.nz/ 27 Nov, at 29. 
81  Namely, personal information in the course of transmission by post, telegram, cable, 
facsimile transmission, electronic mail and other similar means of communication; 
evidence given to a commission of inquiry or in a court, communication between the office 
of the Ombudsman and an agency, or between the Commissioner and an agency (Privacy 
Act of 1993 s 55(a)-(e)). 
82  Privacy Act of 1993 s 55. 
83  Ibid s 56. 
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This last-mentioned exemption is found in many of the recent data protection 
instruments.84 The rationale is that this type of processing (eg, the collection 
and storing of names and telephone numbers of friends and family members) 
does not create a serious threat of privacy infringement. This is true, as long as 
the individual collecting the information does not place it on the internet and 
make it available to more persons than his or her family!85
 
 
2.5.3 Information privacy principles 
The twelve information privacy principles are the mainstay of the Act. 
Information privacy principles, also referred to as data protection principles or 
fair information principles, are found in one form or another in most data 
protection instruments.86
 
 The aim of data protection principles is to ensure that 
the processing of personal information is done lawfully and fairly towards the 
data subject (that is, the individual whose personal information is processed).  
Looking at how the principles in the Privacy Act are formulated, it is evident that 
the Privacy Act distinguishes between the different stages of data processing. 
The Act has principles that relate to the collection, to the storage, to the use or 
to the disclosure of personal information. In this regard the Privacy Act can be 
improved. The trend among more recent data protection Acts (such as the UK 
Data Protection Act of 1998) is no longer to distinguish between the different 
stages of processing but to refer only to the 'processing' of information. The 
reason is that, in the modern online environment, the distinction between 
collecting, storing, processing and transfer of data becomes blurred. It is 
therefore more sensible to regulate the 'processing' of personal data. 
Processing refers to almost any action that can be performed on personal 
information.87
                                            
84  See, eg, the data protection Acts of the UK (the Data Protection Act of 1998 s 36) and of 
the Netherlands (Wet Bescherming Persoonsgegevens of 2000 art 2(2)(a)). 
  
85  Social networking sites such as MySpace or Facebook allow an individual to put the 
information of friends and family on his or her web page.  
86  See further Roos 2006 CILSA 107 et seq. 
87 Ibid 105. 
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The information privacy principles of the Privacy Act do not override other laws 
which govern the collection, use or disclosure of personal information.88 All of 
the information privacy principles are found in section 6 of the Act.89 All of the 
first four, (1) “Purpose of collection of personal information", (2) “Source of 
personal information", (3) “Collection of information from subject” and (4) 
“Manner of collection of personal information", deal with the collection stage of 
data processing.90 Principle 1 directs an agency to collect personal information 
only for a lawful purpose that is connected with a function of the agency, and 
only if that collection is necessary for that purpose. As will be indicated, the 
purpose for which the information is collected plays an important role in many 
of the other principles. Principle 2 provides that information must be collected 
directly from the individual concerned, unless specific exceptions are present.91
                                            
88  S 7 Privacy Act of 1993. 
 
Principle 3 requires that the agency must take reasonable steps, at the time of 
collection of the information, to inform the individual of certain matters, such as 
the fact that the collection of the information is taking place, the purpose for 
which it is collected, the intended recipients of the information, the names and 
addresses of the persons who are collecting the information, and who will hold 
it. The individual should also be informed whether the information is collected 
under authority of a specific law, whether or not the provision of the information 
is mandatory, the consequences if the individual fails to provide all the 
information, and also of the individual’s right to access and request correction 
of data. An agency is not required to take these steps if they have already done 
89  It is therefore not useful to give a footnote reference for each separate principle.  
90  S 6 Privacy Act, principles 1-4. 
91  The exceptions are when the agency collecting the information believes on reasonable 
grounds as follows: that the information is publicly available; or that the individual 
concerned authorises collection of the information from someone else; or that the interests 
of the individual concerned are not prejudiced; or that it is necessary for a public sector 
agency to collect the information to uphold or enforce the law, protect the tax base, or 
assist court or tribunal proceedings; or that complying with this principle would prejudice 
the purposes of collection; or that complying with this principle would not be reasonably 
practical in the particular case; or that the information will not be used in a form that 
identifies the individual; or that the Privacy Commissioner has authorised collection under 
s 54. 
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so in relation to the same personal information, or information of the same kind, 
on a recent, previous occasion. Other exemptions from the duty to inform the 
individual are also available in particular circumstances.92
 
 Principle 4 provides 
that personal information may not be collected by unlawful means or in a 
manner that is unfair or intrudes unreasonably into the individual’s personal 
affairs. 
Principle 5 (“Storage and security of personal information”) directs that the 
agency that holds the information must take reasonable security measures to 
ensure that there are reasonable safeguards against loss, misuse or 
disclosure. If it is necessary to give information to another person, such as 
someone working on contract, everything reasonable must be done to prevent 
unauthorised use or unauthorised disclosure of the information. 
 
Principle 6 (“Access to personal information”) and principle 7 (“Correction of 
personal information”) provide that the individual has a right to obtain 
confirmation from the agency whether it holds information on him or her, to 
have access to such information and to request correction of incorrect 
information. If agencies have already passed on personal information that they 
then correct, they should inform the recipients about the correction. The Act 
makes detailed provision for the manner in which the rights to access and 
correction should be exercised.93 The Act limits the right to request access to 
an individual who is a New Zealand citizen, a permanent resident of New 
Zealand or an individual who is in New Zealand.94 The Act provides for several 
exemptions, inter alia relating to security, prevention and detection of crime and 
the safety of individuals, from the right to access personal data.95
                                            
92  Namely, if the information is publicly available; if the collection has been authorised by the 
individual; if it is necessary for a public sector agency to collect the information to uphold 
or enforce the law, protect the tax base, or assist court or tribunal proceedings; or if 
compliance is not reasonably practicable in the particular case; or if the information will not 
be used in a form in which the individual concerned is identified. 
 
93  Ss 33-45 (Part 5) Privacy Act of 1993. 
94  Ibid s 34. 
95  Access to information may be refused for a range of reasons, including the fact that 
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Once information has been collected, the Act provides in principle 8 (“Accuracy, 
etc, of personal information to be checked before use”) that the agency must 
take steps that are reasonable in the circumstances to ensure that the 
information is accurate, up-to-date, complete, relevant and not misleading, 
before it is used or disclosed. These qualities have to be determined with 
reference to the purpose for which it was collected, because information that 
may be relevant, complete or up-to-date for one purpose might be irrelevant, 
incomplete or outdated for another.  
 
Principle 9 (“Agency not to keep personal information for longer than 
necessary”) provides that information may not be kept for longer than is 
necessary for the purpose for which it was collected. Principle 10 (“Limits on 
the use of personal information”) limits the use of the collected information to 
the purpose for which it was collected. Information may be used for a different 
purpose from the one it was collected for only if the agency believes on 
reasonable grounds that one of several situations listed in the Act which allows 
the different use is applicable.96
 
  
                                                                                                                               
access would pose risks to New Zealand’s security or defence, breach confidences with 
another government, prevent detection of criminal offences or the right to a fair trial, 
endanger the safety of an individual, disclose a trade secret or unreasonably prejudice 
someone’s commercial position, involve an unwarranted breach of another individual’s 
privacy, breach confidence where the information has been gained solely for reasons to do 
with the individual’s employment or to decide whether to insure the individual, be contrary 
to the interests of an individual under the age of 16, breach legal professional privilege, 
reveal the confidential source of information provided to a Radio New Zealand or 
Television New Zealand journalist, or constitute contempt of court or the House of 
Representatives (Ibid ss 27-32 [Part 4]). 
96  Namely, if the use is one of the purposes for which the information was collected; or the 
use is directly related to the purpose the information was obtained for; or the agency got 
the information from a publicly available publication; or the individual concerned has 
authorised the use; or the use is necessary for a public sector agency to collect the 
information to uphold or enforce the law, protect the tax base, or assist court or tribunal 
proceedings; or the use is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to 
public health or safety, or the life or health of any individual; or the individual concerned is 
not identified; or the use is authorised by the Privacy Commissioner under s 54 of the Act. 
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Principle 11 (“Limits on disclosure of personal information”) provides that 
personal information may be disclosed only in certain limited situations listed in 
the Act.97
 
  
Principle 12 (“Unique identifiers”) is new, in the sense that it is not found in the 
OECD Guidelines on which the Privacy Act is based. It regulates the use of 
unique identifiers, such as bank customer numbers, driver’s licence and 
passport numbers. These identifiers must not be assigned to individuals unless 
this is necessary for the organisation concerned to carry out its functions 
efficiently. The identifiers must be truly unique to each individual (except in 
some tax-related circumstances) and the identity of individuals must be clearly 
established. No one is required to disclose their unique identifier unless it is for 
or related to one of the purposes for which the identifier was assigned. It 
follows from this that the Government is not allowed to give people one 
personal number to use in all of their dealings with government agencies.98 
This prevents the linking of files (also referred to as information matching)99 
from different agencies by means of the same unique identifier.100
                                            
97  The agency may disclose information only if the agency reasonably believes that the 
disclosure is in connection with, or directly related to, one of the purposes for which it was 
obtained; or the agency got the information from a publicly available publication; or 
disclosure is to the individual concerned; or disclosure is authorised by the individual 
concerned; or it is necessary for a public sector agency to disclose the information to 
uphold or enforce the law, protect the tax base, or assist court or tribunal proceedings; or 
disclosure is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to public health 
or safety, or the life or health of any individual; or disclosure is necessary to facilitate the 
sale of a business as a going concern; or the information is to be used in a form in which 
the individual concerned is not identified; or disclosure has been authorised by the Privacy 
Commissioner under s 54. 
 
98  See NZ Privacy Commissioner Fact Sheet no 2 http://www.privacy.org.nz 18 Jun. 
99  Information matching, data matching, computer matching or record linkages entail the 
comparison of the records of different agencies or institutions by using a common 
denominator, such as a social security number, to find persons who may be included in 
more than one file, in order to determine, for example, whether ineligible persons are 
receiving benefits under a government programme. The aim of these programmes is 
usually to eliminate fraud, waste and abuse from government programmes, but a side-
effect could be that the government builds up dossiers about individuals. See Flaherty, 
supra n 12, 344. See also Borking “Privacy Technology” 97; Madsen Personal Data 
Protection 12; Turkington and Allen Privacy Law 313. 
100  The public sector may make use of information matching, but only within the limits of the 
Privacy Act of 1993. The Commissioner must examine proposed legislation that makes 
provision for information matching and must report to the responsible Minister the results 
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The Privacy Act also contains four public register privacy principles which limit 
the following: the manner in which information can be made available from 
public registers, the re-sorting or combining of public register information for 
commercial gain, the electronic transmission of public registers, and the 
charging for access to public register information.101
 
 
A data protection principle found in other data protection instruments,102 which 
is absent in the Privacy Act, is the principle that personal information that is 
considered to be 'sensitive’ should be subject to more stringent controls than 
non-sensitive personal information.103 This principle is manifested primarily in 
rules that place special limits on the processing of predefined categories of 
data.104 Information that is considered 'sensitive' is information on a person’s 
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade 
union membership, health and sexual life.105
                                                                                                                               
of the examination. Part 10 of the Act (ss 97-109) contains specific provisions to regulate 
information matching. All authorised information matching programmes are listed in sch 3 
of the Act. Sch 4 contains rules that must be complied with when authorised matching 
takes place. S 105 of the Privacy Act requires an annual report on each authorised 
matching programme carried out in that year. 
 It is suggested that the Privacy Act 
can be improved by incorporating a sensitivity principle. 
101  Ibid s 59.  
102  See, eg, s 2 UK Data Protection Act of 1998. 
103  The reason why the Privacy Act does not contain this provision is that such a provision is 
absent in the OECD Guidelines on which the New Zealand legislation is based. The Group 
of Experts, drafting the OECD Guidelines, could not reach consensus on which categories 
of data deserve special protection. It was confronted by two opposing views as regards the 
enumeration of sensitive data. One view, which was supported by European legislatures, 
was that it is both possible and desirable to enumerate types of data which are intrinsically 
sensitive, with the result that the collection of these types of data should be prohibited or at 
least restricted. Examples of such sensitive data are data that relate to race, religious 
beliefs and criminal records. The other view, support for which may be found in the privacy 
legislation of the USA, the Privacy Act of 1974, was that no data were intrinsically sensitive 
or private, but become so as a result of their context and use. In the end the Group of 
Experts found it impossible to define any set of data which was universally regarded as 
sensitive, and consequently only formulated a general criterion that there should be limits 
to the collection of personal data. The nature of the limits to the collection of data is not 
spelt out, but in the OECD Guidelines 29 it is envisaged that the limits relate inter alia to 
the 'earmarking' of especially sensitive data according to traditions and attitudes in each 
member country. See also Bygrave, supra n 2, 69. 
104  See further Roos, supra n 86, 121; Bygrave, supra n 2, 68-69. 
105  Art 8(1) Dir 95/46/EC. 
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2.5.4 Oversight and enforcement of the Act: the Privacy Commissioner and 
Human Rights Review Tribunal 
The Commissioner can be thought of as the 'statutory guardian' of the Privacy 
Act.106 One of the most important functions of the Commissioner is to receive 
complaints. An individual who feels aggrieved by an interference with his or her 
privacy under the Act107 may lodge a complaint with the Privacy 
Commissioner.108 An individual does not, for the most part, have recourse to 
the courts for a breach of an information privacy principle. In terms of the Act, 
only the entitlement to access data held by a public sector agency can be 
enforced in a court of law.109 None of the other information privacy principles 
confers legal rights enforceable in a court of law.110
 
  
Once a complaint has been lodged, the Privacy Commissioner can respond in 
several ways. It may be decided not to investigate the matter, if the complaint is 
trivial or vexatious or otherwise unworthy of investigation.111
                                            
106  See Mount, supra n 77, 411. 
 If this is not the 
case, the Commissioner must investigate the matter and act as a conciliator (or 
107  In terms of s 66 of the Privacy Act, an action is an interference with the privacy of the 
individual for the purposes of a complaint under the Privacy Act, “if, and only if,— 
(a)  In relation to that individual— 
(i) The action breaches an information privacy principle; or 
(ii) The action breaches a code of practice issued under section 63 of this Act (which 
relates to public registers); or 
(iii) The provisions of Part 10 of this Act (which relates to information matching) have 
not been complied with; and  
(b) In the opinion of the Commissioner or, as the case may be, the Tribunal, the action— 
(i)  Has caused, or may cause, loss, detriment, damage, or injury to that individual; 
or 
(ii)  Has adversely affected, or may adversely affect, the rights, benefits, privileges, 
obligations, or interests of that individual; or  
(iii)  Has resulted in, or may result in, significant humiliation, significant loss of dignity, 
or significant injury to the feelings of that individual.” 
108  Ibid s 67. 
109  Ibid s 11(1). 
110  Ibid s 11(2). This is not necessarily a weakness in the Privacy Act, since the Act does 
provide for independent adjudication and for compensation to be paid and sanctions 
imposed where appropriate. These functions are performed by the Human Rights Review 
Tribunal (ibid s 71(2)). 
111  Ibid s 71. 
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mediator) in the matter.112 The Commissioner may, in order to settle the matter, 
call a compulsory conference between the parties to the complaint.113
 
  
The Commissioner may also decide to refer the complaint, where appropriate, 
to another body such as an Ombudsman, the Health and Disability 
Commissioner or the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.114 In some 
cases the matter may be taken further, to the Human Rights Review 
Tribunal.115 The Tribunal may give the relief that it thinks is suitable. This may 
include a declaration that there is an interference with the privacy of the 
plaintiff, damages, or an order either prohibiting or compelling certain action on 
the part of the defendant.116
 
 
The Commissioner has several other functions in terms of the Act. A few of 
these functions can be listed by way of example.117 The Commissioner must 
promote, by education and publicity, an understanding and acceptance of the 
information privacy principles and of the objects of those principles; must 
monitor and report on the use of unique identifiers; must maintain and publish 
directories of personal information;118
                                            
112  Ibid s 69(1). 
 and must examine any proposed 
legislation that makes provision for the collection of personal information by a 
public sector agency, or the disclosure of personal information by one public 
sector agency to another public sector agency. The Commissioner may inquire 
generally into any matter, enactment, law, practice or procedure, or any 
technical development, that appears to infringe the privacy of the individual and 
113  Ibid s 76. 
114  Ibid ss 72, 72A and 72B. 
115  Ibid s 71(2). 
116  Ibid s 85. 
117  See further ibid s 13. 
118  In terms of s 21 Privacy Act of 1993. The Commissioner may from time to time publish one 
or more publications that include information on the nature of and the purpose for which 
personal information is held, the classes of individuals about whom personal information is 
held, the period for which any type of personal information is held, the individuals who are 
entitled to have access to the personal information and the conditions under which they 
are entitled to have that access, and the steps that should be taken by any individual 
wishing to obtain access to personal information held by an agency. 
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may undertake research into and monitor developments in data processing and 
computer technology to ensure that any adverse effects of such developments 
on the privacy of individuals are minimised. He or she may report to the 
responsible Minister the results of such research and monitoring, may examine 
any proposed legislation that may affect the privacy of individuals, and may 
report to the Prime Minister from time to time on the desirability of the 
acceptance, by New Zealand, of any international instrument relating to the 
privacy of the individual. 
 
2.5.5 Codes of practice 
The Privacy Commissioner has the power to issue codes of practice that 
become law.119
 
 Codes of practice are sometimes also referred to as codes of 
conduct. The purpose of a code of conduct (or code of practice) is to translate 
the legislative provisions into a practical application in the specific information 
sector involved.  
The effect of a code issued under the Privacy Act is that it modifies the 
operation of the Act for a specific industry, agency, activity or type of personal 
information.120 Codes often modify one or more of the information privacy 
principles by prescribing standards that are either more or less stringent.121 In 
this way account can be taken of special circumstances which affect a class of 
agencies (such as credit reporters) or a class of information (such as health 
information). 122
 
  
Codes of practice are issued by the Commissioner, either after receiving 
proposals for a code by a representative body of a particular class of agency or 
                                            
119  Ibid s 46(1). 
120  Ibid s 46(3). 
121  Ibid s 46(2). 
122  At present, codes of practice have inter alia been adopted for the credit reporting industry, 
the health information industry and the telecommunications industry. See the Privacy 
Commissioner’s website at http://www.privacy.org.nz. 
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industry, or on the Commissioner’s own initiative.123 Codes of practice can be 
amended or revoked by the Commissioner.124
 
 This makes them a flexible 
means of regulation.  
Codes of practice are deemed to be regulations,125
 
 which mean that they must 
be presented to the House of Representatives.  
2.5.6 Conclusion 
In general, it can be said that New Zealand has a data protection regime that 
functions well. The Privacy Act of 1993 allows individuals to have a measure of 
control over the processing of their personal information.126 The Commissioner 
fulfils a conciliatory function and complaints are resolved without the need for 
expensive litigation.127
 
 
New Zealand’s data protection law goes a long way to providing adequate data 
protection as required by the EU Directive on data protection.128 The EU has 
not made a finding to that effect, however. According to the Privacy 
Commissioner, the “Privacy Act requires a couple of amendments before New 
Zealand might be adjudged ‘adequate'".129
 
 The following two amendments are 
considered necessary: 
(1) The Act should include a provision that restricts trans-border 
movement of personal data. In other words, once personal 
information is imported into New Zealand, there should be a provision 
                                            
123  Ibid s 47. 
124  Ibid s 51. 
125  Ibid s 50. 
126 During 2006-2007 the Commissioner’s office received 640 privacy complaints. About two-
thirds of those complaints were about access to personal information or disclosure of 
personal information. 
127  Many complaints are resolved without the need of escalating them to the Tribunal. 
According to the NZ Privacy Commissioner Annual Report 2007 “[o]f the 701 complaints 
closed in 2006/07, 75% (524) were successfully settled without needing to proceed to a 
final opinion” (supra n 80, 7). 
128  See NZLC SP 19 par 4.53.  
129  See Shroff “Privacy and Sovereignty” 9. 
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in the Privacy Act prohibiting the further transfer of the data to a 
country which does not provide adequate data protection. A provision 
similar to section 25 of the EU Directive is needed to remedy this 
shortcoming.130
(2) The restrictions on the right to request access should be removed. As 
seen, at present only New Zealand citizens, permanent residents and 
individuals present in New Zealand may make a request for 
access.
 
131
  
 
 
3 South African law  
3.1 Introduction 
Although the scope of the article does not permit an extensive discussion of the 
South African position,132
 
 it is necessary to familiarise the reader with the 
current situation in South Africa before any recommendations can be made 
based on the New Zealand experience. 
3.2 Protection of privacy and identity in common law 
The processing of data can infringe on a person’s personality primarily in two 
ways: where true personal information is processed, a person’s privacy is 
infringed, and where false or misleading information is processed, the person’s 
identity is infringed.133 Privacy and identity are personality interests that are 
protected in the law of delict by the actio iniuriarum.134
                                            
130  Art 25(1) Dir 95/46/EC provides as follows: "The Member States shall provide that the 
transfer to a third country of personal data which are undergoing processing or are 
intended for processing after transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to 
compliance with the national provisions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this 
Directive, the third country in question ensures an adequate level of protection." 
 With this action 
satisfaction is claimed for the wrongful, intentional interference with a 
131  S 34 Privacy Act of 1993. 
132  See Roos, supra n 2, for a discussion of the current SA position against the background of 
international standards in data protection. 
133 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Personality 270-271. 
134  Ibid 29, 36, 39. 
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personality interest.135 Patrimonial loss that flows from the wrongful, negligent 
infringement of the personality can be claimed with the actio legis Aquiliae.136 
An interdict is also available to avert an impending interference with the right to 
privacy or identity, or to prevent the continuation of a wrongful infringement.137
 
  
At common law, privacy has been recognised since the mid-1950s as a 
separate personality interest worthy of protection: O’Keeffe v Argus Printing 
and Publishing Co Ltd138 is regarded as the locus classicus for the recognition 
of an independent right to privacy in South African law.139 Other cases followed 
O’Keeffe in which the right to be free from the public disclosure of private 
facts140 and the right to be free from unreasonable intrusions into the private 
sphere141 were recognised.142 Both individuals and juristic persons are entitled 
to a right to privacy.143
 
  
Neethling’s144
                                            
135  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 5. 
 definition of privacy as “an individual condition of life character-
ised by seclusion from the public and publicity ... [which] condition embraces all 
those personal facts which the person concerned has himself [or herself] 
determined to be excluded from the knowledge of outsiders and in respect of 
136  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Personality 67. 
137  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 237. 
138  1954 3 SA 244 (C). 
139  See Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Personality 217.  
140 Eg Mhlongo v Bailey 1958 1 SA 370 (C) (unauthorised publication of a photograph of a 
retired schoolteacher portraying him as a young man in the company of a well-known 
singer); Rhodesian Printing and Publishing v Duggan 1975 1 SA 590 (R) (a story about 
young children abducted from the custody of their parents); La Grange v Schoeman 1980 
1 SA 885 (E) (attempted photographing of security policemen described by counsel at a 
trial as having been responsible for the death of a detainee). 
141 Eg Gosschalk v Rossouw 1966 2 SA 476 (C) 492 (improperly interrogating a detainee); S 
v A 1971 2 SA 293 (T) (electronically bugging a person’s home). 
142  Recent cases in which the former Appellate Division (now the Supreme Court of Appeal) 
also recognised and discussed the right to privacy include Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger 
1993 4 SA 842 (A), National Media v Jooste 1996 3 SA 262 (A) Financial Mail v Sage 
Holdings 1993 2 SA 451 (A) and Janit v Motor Industry Fund Administrators 1995 4 SA 
293 (A). 
143 Financial Mail v Sage Holdings 1993 2 SA 451 (A) 462-463; Motor Industry Fund v Janit 
1994 3 SA 56 (W) 60-61; Janit v Motor Industry Fund Administrators 1995 4 SA 293 (A) 
304. See also Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) 557. 
144  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Personality 32. 
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which he [or she] has the will that they be kept private” has been accepted by 
the South African courts.145
 
  
Since privacy relates to personal facts which a person has determined should 
be excluded from the knowledge of outsiders, it follows that privacy can be 
infringed only when someone learns of true private facts about the person 
against his or her determination and will.146 Such knowledge can be acquired in 
one of two ways:147 (1) where an outsider himself or herself learns of the facts 
(such interference with privacy is referred to as intrusion or acquaintance),148 or 
(2) where an outsider acquaints third parties with personal facts which, 
although known to the outsider, nonetheless remain private (such interference 
with privacy is referred to as disclosure or publicity).149
 
 
Privacy must be distinguished from identity. Identity is defined as “a person’s 
uniqueness or individuality which identifies or individualises him [or her] as a 
particular person and thus distinguishes him [or her] from others".150 Identity is 
infringed when the personality image of a person is falsified. Two of the torts 
recognised by Prosser as an infringement of the right to privacy151 can be 
classified as infringements of the right to identity, namely “publicity which 
places the plaintiff in a false light” and “appropriation for the defendant’s 
advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness".152
 
  
                                            
145  See, eg, National Media v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A) 271-272.  
146 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 33. 
147 Ibid 322; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Personality 33; Motor Industry Fund 
Administrators v Janit 1994 3 SA 56 (W) 60; Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) 789. 
Compare Financial Mail v Sage Holdings 1993 2 SA 451 (A) 462- 463; also see McQuoid-
Mason Privacy 134.  
148 Eg by unlawfully intruding on property, searching and seizing documents, secretly 
watching someone or using surveillance equipment to gather information on someone (see 
S v A 1971 2 SA 293 (T)).  
149 An example of an acquaintance through disclosure is when a doctor tells his friends about 
a patient’s HIV status (see Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger 1993 4 SA 842 (A)). 
150 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Personality 36.  
151  See par 2.2 above. 
152  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Personality 37. 
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Identity was described as an independent personality interest worthy of 
delictual protection in Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) 
Bpk,153 but until 2007 this interest was usually protected in case law under the 
guise of other personality interests, such as the right to a good name and the 
right to privacy.154 However, in 2007 the Supreme Court of Appeal in Grutter v 
Lombard155 gave recognition to identity as a separate personality interest. The 
court held that a person’s name as a feature of his or her right to identity 
constitutes an interest that is capable of legal protection. According to the court, 
a person’s interest in preserving his or her identity against unauthorised 
exploitation is encompassed by the concept of dignitas, which incorporates 
both identity and privacy. The court confirmed that infringements of these 
interests are considered iniuriae in South African law and, as such, covered in 
terms of both liability and remedies by the law of delict.156
 
 
Although South Africa has a well-developed level of protection for the right to 
privacy and identity in the law of delict, this is not sufficient to provide adequate 
data protection. The traditional delictual principles provide only limited protec-
tion for the individual’s personal information. Delictual principles do not give the 
individual active control over personal information that is being processed.157 
The traditional principles are useful to determining whether or not processing of 
personal information has taken place lawfully. However, the traditional 
principles cannot ensure, for example, that the data subject has knowledge of 
the fact that his or her personal information has been collected, or that he or 
she has access to the information, or that he or she may correct incorrect 
information.158
 
 
                                            
153 1977 4 SA 376 (T) 386.  
154 See O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing 1954 3 SA 244 (C) and Kidson v SA 
Associated Newspapers 1957 3 SA 461 (W) (unauthorised use of a photograph for a false 
newspaper story).  
155  2007 4 SA 89 (SCA) par [12]. 
156  2007 4 SA 89 (SCA) par [12]. See also Neethling 2007 TSAR 834. 
157 See Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Personality 278. 
158  See also Roos, supra n 2, 423.  
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3.3 Protection of privacy and identity in constitutional law 
Privacy is expressly protected in section 14 of the Constitution.159 The 
constitutional right to informational privacy has been interpreted by the 
Constitutional Court as coming into play wherever a person has the ability to 
decide what he or she wishes to disclose to the public and the expectation that 
such a decision will be respected is reasonable.160 In other words, it extends to 
those aspects of a person’s life in regard to which he or she has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy.161 “The interest that a person has in preserving his or 
her identity against unauthorised exploitation” has been recognised in Grutter v 
Lombard162 as a fundamental right protected under section 10 of the 
Constitution, as “one of ‘a variety of personal rights’ that are included in the 
concept of dignitas in the context of the actio injuriarum". Since privacy and 
identity are protected as fundamental rights, this constitutional imperative 
obliges the government to adopt legislation for the adequate protection of 
information privacy, since ordinary private law principles provide only partial 
protection in this respect. Such principles can be introduced only by legislation 
and not by the courts.163
 
  
                                            
159  S 14 provides as follows:  
Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have:  
(a) their person or home searched; 
(b) their property searched; 
(c) their possessions seized; 
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed. 
160 See Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors 
2001 1 SA 545 (CC) 557. See further Roos, supra n 2, 400. The constitutional right to 
privacy extends further than the delictual right to privacy, and protects interests such as 
autonomy also. 
161 Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) 792; Protea Technology v Wainer [1997] 3 All SA 
594 (W) 608; 1997 9 BCLR 1225 (W) 1241.  
162  2007 4 SA 89 (SCA) par 12. 
163 There are two reasons for this. First of all, in view of the inherent conservatism of the 
courts it is improbable that the application of the traditional data protection principles by 
the courts will occur often or extensively enough in the near future (see Neethling, 
Potgieter and Visser Law of Personality 272). Secondly, the most important force behind 
legal reform is the legislature and not the judiciary; see Carmichele v Minister of Safety 
and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening 2001 4 SA 938 (CC)). Since the 
introduction of a new data (privacy) protection regime is not merely an incremental change 
of the law, but a sometimes radical departure from existing law and an extensive 
regulation of the present field, it is a task for the legislature (Neethling 2002 THRHR 587).  
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3.4 Data protection provisions in statutory law 
South Africa does not have an omnibus data protection law. Instead, we have 
three statutes that contain some (limited) data protection provisions, namely the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act,164 the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act165 and the National Credit Act.166 These Acts cannot be 
considered as omnibus data protection laws. Even when their legal effects are 
considered together, they do not provide adequate data protection for all 
personal information processed in South Africa.167
 
 
The recommendations of the South African Law Reform Commission for an 
omnibus data protection law for South Africa which is encapsulated in a draft 
Bill (the Draft Bill on the Protection of Personal Information) are as follows:168
 
 
a) Privacy and information protection should be regulated by a general 
information protection statute, with or without sector specific statutes, 
which will be supplemented by codes of conduct for the various 
sectors and will be applicable to both the public and private sector. 
Automatic and manual processing will be covered and identifiable 
                                            
164  Act 2 of 2000. This Act promotes the data protection principle of access to personal 
information, by permitting individuals access to both manual and computer records 
containing personal information about themselves (ss 11 and 50). 
165  Act 25 of 2002. Ch VIII of this Act aims to address the privacy concerns of consumers by 
enumerating principles in s 51 that must be adhered to when a data controller 
electronically collects personal information. However, the Act does not impose legally 
binding obligations on data controllers, but provides that “a data controller may voluntarily 
subscribe to the principles by recording such fact in any agreement with a data subject” (s 
50(2)). 
166  Act 34 of 2005. This Act regulates the processing of personal information in the consumer 
industry. The Act provides that a person who receives, compiles, retains or reports 
confidential information pertaining to a consumer or prospective consumer must protect 
the confidentiality of that information (s 68(1)). Credit bureaus have certain duties in 
respect of consumer credit information. They must inter alia take reasonable steps to verify 
the accuracy of such information reported to them, retain such information for prescribed 
periods, maintain consumer credit records in accordance with prescribed standards, and 
expunge information that is not permitted to be stored. They must also issue a report to 
any person who requires it for a prescribed purpose or a purpose contemplated in the Act 
and may not knowingly or negligently provide a report containing inaccurate information (s 
70(2)). 
167  See Roos, supra n 2, 424-433 for a full discussion of these Acts.  
168  See SALRC Privacy and Data Protection, supra n 17, vi-vii.  
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natural and juristic persons will be protected [Chapter 2, clauses 3-
6].169
b) General principles of information protection should be developed and 
incorporated in the legislation. The proposed Bill gives effect to eight 
core information protection principles, namely processing limitation, 
purpose specification, further processing limitation, information 
quality, openness, security safeguards, individual participation and 
accountability. Provision is made for exceptions to the information 
protection principles [Chapter 3, Part A, clauses 7-23]. Exemptions 
are furthermore possible for specific sectors in applicable 
circumstances [Chapter 4, clauses 32-33]. Special provision has 
furthermore been made for the protection of special (sensitive) 
personal information [Chapter 3, Part B, clauses 24-31]. 
 
c) A statutory regulatory agency should be established. Provision has 
been made for an independent Information Protection Commission 
with a full-time Information Commissioner to direct the work of the 
Commission [Chapter 5, Part A, clauses 34-46]. The Commission will 
be responsible for the implementation of both the Protection of 
Personal Information Act (see Annexure B) and the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act, 2000. Data subjects will be under an 
obligation to notify the Commission of any processing of personal 
information before they undertake such processing [Chapter 6, Part 
A, clauses 47-51] and provision has also been made for prior 
investigations to be conducted where the information being collected 
warrants a stricter regime [Chapter 6, Part B, clauses 52-53]. 
d) Enforcement of the Bill will be through the Commission using as a 
first step a system of notices where conciliation or mediation has not 
been successful. Failure to comply with the notices will be a criminal 
offence. The Commission may furthermore assist a data subject in 
                                            
169  References in brackets are to the applicable clauses, parts and chapters in the Protection 
of Personal Information Bill set out in Annexure B to SALRC Privacy and Data Protection, 
supra n 17. 
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claiming compensation from a responsible party for any damage 
suffered. Obstruction of the Commission’s work is regarded in a very 
serious light and constitutes a criminal offence [Chapter 8, clauses 
63-87 and Chapter 9, clauses 88-92]. 
e) A flexible approach should be followed in which industries will 
develop their own codes of conduct (in accordance with the principles 
set out in the legislation) which will be overseen by the regulatory 
agency. Codes of conduct for individual sectors may be drawn up for 
specific sectors on the initiative of the specific sector or of the 
Commission itself. This will include the possibility of making provision 
for an adjudicator to be responsible for the supervision of information 
protection activities in the sector. The Commission will, however, 
retain oversight authority. Although the codes will accurately reflect 
the information protection principles as set out in the Act, it should 
furthermore assist in the practical application of the rules in a specific 
sector [Chapter 7, clauses 54-62]. 
f) It is the Law Commission’s objective to ensure that the legislation 
provides an adequate level of information protection in terms of the 
EU Directive. In this regard a provision has been included that 
prohibits the transfer of personal information to countries that do not, 
themselves, ensure an adequate level of information protection 
[Chapter 10, clause 94]. 
 
These proposals contain a set of information privacy principles which, if 
complied with, will ensure fair and lawful processing. They provide for oversight 
by an independent body and remedies are made available should the data 
controller not comply with the provisions of the proposed Act. They specifically 
provide for processing that involves sensitive personal information and imposes 
restrictions on the onward transfer of personal data. It is submitted that these 
proposals, which have been in “suspended animation”170
                                            
170  Engelbrecht 2008 
 for three years, will 
http://www.itweb.co.za/sections 16 Jun. 
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provide adequate data protection as required by the EU Directive. However, as 
long as it remains a draft Bill it does not have any legal consequences. 
 
 
4 Lessons for South Africa from the New Zealand experience 
Can South Africa learn any lessons from New Zealand data protection law? We 
have seen that New Zealand only recently recognised a tort of publication of 
private facts, whereas South Africa’s protection of the right to privacy is better 
developed and more extensive than that of New Zealand. Privacy is also 
expressly protected in our Constitution, whereas New Zealand’s Bill of Rights 
Act does not list privacy as a protected right.171
 
 One may be forgiven for 
assuming that South Africa places a higher value on the individual’s right to 
privacy than New Zealand does. Despite all of this, New Zealand adopted a 
data protection Act fifteen years ago, while South Africa still has not done so.  
If there is one thing we can learn from New Zealand law, it is the necessity of a 
data protection law. New Zealand has had its Act in place for more than fifteen 
years. During this time all the parties involved (individuals, agencies, the 
Commissioner and the Human Rights Review Tribunal) became experienced in 
the application of the Privacy Act and individuals came to understand their 
rights in terms thereof. Although the Privacy Act needs improvement, 
something the New Zealand legislature recognises,172 the Act in its present 
form already complies with most of the international standards of adequate 
data protection.173
 
  
                                            
171  Refer to Roos, supra n 2, 421 et seq for a discussion of the protection of privacy under 
South African common law and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
172  According to the NZLC SP 19 par 1.15, the Ministry of Justice is undertaking work on 
modernising the Privacy Act of 1993. 
173  The fact that an adequate level of data protection is required by the EU Directive on data 
protection before personal information will be allowed to be transferred from the EU to a 
non-EU country is discussed by Roos 2007 SALJ 400. 
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Looking at the specific provisions of the New Zealand Privacy Act of 1993, the 
exemption made for the news media is worth further research, with a view to 
implementing a similar provision in a South African data protection Act. It is 
important that freedom of speech should be balanced with the right to privacy. 
Should South Africa decide to adopt a protection of personal information Act, it 
is suggested that the Act should contain a provision that maintains an 
appropriate balance between the protection of privacy and the protection of 
freedom of speech. This may, for example, mean that exemptions should be 
made from the data protection principles where personal data are processed 
solely for journalistic purposes or for the purpose of artistic or literary 
expression.174
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
174  See also art 9 Dir 95/46/EC. 
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5 Conclusion 
Despite South Africa’s apparently high regard for the individual’s right to privacy 
and identity and our well-developed common and constitutional law of privacy, 
South Africa does not meet the adequacy requirement of the EU Directive 
because we do not have a data protection Act. This means that South African 
participants in the information technology arena are at a constant 
disadvantage. Contractual clauses have to be used to provide for adequate 
data protection measures for every international commercial transaction that 
involves the transfer of personal information from overseas to South Africa, 
such as the selling of tickets for the World Cup games in the names of specific 
persons.175
 
 It is suggested that South Africa can take note of the New Zealand 
experience, since it provides a good example of a well-functioning data 
protection regime. In conclusion, the South African legislature is urged to adopt 
the proposals of the South African Law Reform Commission as a matter of 
urgency. 
 
                                            
175  See Roos, supra n 2, 411-413 for more detail.  
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